Electronic Voting Service Using Block-Chain by Lee, Kibin et al.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 11 Number 2 Article 8 
2016 
Electronic Voting Service Using Block-Chain 
Kibin Lee 
Korea University 
Joshua I. James 
Hallym University, joshua.i.james@pm.me 
Tekachew G. Ejeta 
Korea University 
Hyoung J. Kim 
Korea University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee, Kibin; James, Joshua I.; Ejeta, Tekachew G.; and Kim, Hyoung J. (2016) "Electronic Voting Service 
Using Block-Chain," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 11 : No. 2 , Article 8. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2016.1383 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol11/iss2/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Electronic Voting Service Using Block-chain … JDFSL V11N2
© 2016 ADFSL Page 123
ELECTRONIC VOTING SERVICE USING
BLOCK-CHAIN
Kibin Lee
Korea University
Graduate School of Information Security
Seoul, Seongbuk 02841
leekibin@korea.ac.kr
Joshua I. James
Hallym University
Legal Informatics and Forensic Science Institute
Gangwon, Chuncheon 24252
joshua.i.james@hallym.ac.kr
Tekachew Gobena Ejeta
Korea University
Department of Cyber Defense
Seoul, Seongbuk 20841
tekachew@korea.ac.kr
Hyoung Joong Kim
Korea University
Graduate School of Information Security
Seoul, Seongbuk 02841
khj-@korea.ac.kr
ABSTRACT
Cryptocurrency, and its underlying technologies, has been gaining popularity for transaction
management beyond financial transactions. Transaction information is maintained in the block-
chain, which can be used to audit the integrity of the transaction. The focus on this paper is the
potential availability of block-chain technology of other transactional uses. Block-chain is one of
the most stable open ledgers that preserves transaction information, and is difficult to forge. Since
the information stored in block-chain is not related to personally identifiable information, it has
the characteristics of anonymity. Also, the block-chain allows for transparent transaction
verification since all information in the block-chain is open to the public. These characteristics are
the same as the requirements for a voting system. That is, strong robustness, anonymity, and
transparency. In this paper, we propose an electronic voting system as an application of block-
chain, and describe block-chain based voting at a national level through examples.
Keywords: Electronic Voting System, Electronic Ballot, Block-chain, Ballot Authentication, e-
voting Auditing:
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INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting systems have been of growing
interest to many governments for the last
several years [1]. This interest, however, has
been followed closely by warnings of security
issues [2-5]. While some methods for creating
transparent voting system protocols have been
proposed [6,7], these methods are both costly
and have not been implemented on a large
scale. Various pilot programs have been run [1,
8], though electronic voting systems have been
fraught with security concerns and controversy
[9]. Despite these concerns, electronic and
remote voting continues to be developed. As
more of a population uses the Internet
regularly, electronic and remote voting
becomes an incentive for greater participation
in democracy [8]. In this work we discuss
criteria of electronic voting, and how block-
chain may be used as a transparent, cost-
effective method to manage and verify
transactions in large-scale voting.
BACKGROUND
Bitcoin, and specifically the block-chain, can
be used to monitor and verify transactions.
This section gives background into the
underlying technologies that will be used in the
proposed electronic voting system.
Public and Private Key and
Bitcoin Address
Bitcoin uses public and private keys for
addressing and transaction signing. A Bitcoin
private key is a random 256 bits. Users use
this key to sign their transactions every time
they transfer Bitcoin. The private key is
randomly generated by users. Since the key has
2256 bits of sample space, it is very unlikely to
intersect with other private keys. The public
key is derived from the private key through an
elliptic curve crypto-algorithm, specifically
secp256k1 [10]. The public key is an (x,y) pair
resulting from the secp256k1 equation
multiplied by the generator (G). This
generator is fixed in Bitcoin systems. This
means that public key uniqueness is not
guaranteed by the generator (G), but is
guaranteed by the uniqueness of the private
key. A public key hash is produced using
SHA256 and RIPEMD160 hashing algorithms
Figure 1. Method of generating a Bitcoin hash from a
public key. [11]
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(Figure 1). The fingerprint of a public key,
called the public key hash, has the size of 160
bits. The public key is Base58Check encoded
to generate the Bitcoin address. Since this
address is generated from a private key that
contains no secret information, addresses can
be known to the public.
The Block-chain
The block-chain is composed of time stamps
which show at what time data (a block) was
added. A block that contains transactions
occurring at a certain time is similar to a time-
stamped binary file. The hash value of the
previous block and the current block will be
the input of the hash value of the next block.
Each hash value of a block is calculated from
the hash value of the previous block, and
transactions are recorded in the block. Since
the hash of the previous block is used to
produce the hash value of the next block, the
next block is “chained” with its prior block,
reinforcing the integrity of all the previous
blocks that came before. Each anterior block
contains information about the hash of prior
blocks, as shown in Figure 2. Since the time
stamping process forms a block-chain linked
with the hash values of each block, each
stamped block can be verified to be a valid
transaction at a specific time. Time-stamped
blocks are created, and blocks are linked
forward to the next block. If any data in a
block is modified, the hash value of the block
will be changed. The result is that the hash of
all blocks to the most recent will be changed.
This forged chain will not be accepted as a
consistent block chain and will be rejected.
Block-chain Safety
In a Bitcoin system, to make it difficult to
forge context in blocks, a random number
called a nonce is introduced to every block.
A nonce is an arbitrary number used only once
to help verify the hash. In order to produce a
fingerprint - i.e., a hash of the block - miners
use the header of the block which is a
predetermined set of data. This set of data
represents all transactions contained in the
block, the date, time and some other data
which can be fixed whenever a certain period
time has passed. Miners do this to try to
validate their proof of work. These header
components and nonce will be put into a hash
function to produce a block hash.
To add to the calculation difficulty, there
is a condition that the block hash should be
smaller than some given value. This means
that the block hash should start with a certain
number of zeros (based on difficulty). When
we take a specific nonce found by a miner and
the current block header, these two values
should produce the fingerprint for the block
hash. Fingerprints are 64 hexadecimal digits.
Assume that the first 15 digits of a hash
should be zeros, so 15 times 4 bits (i.e., 60
bits) at the beginning of the hash should be
zero. The probability that corresponding 60
bits are zero is very low, about 2-60. The
current Bitcoin network requires 17 zeros at
the beginning, so 68 bits must be zeros.
Figure 2. Structure of Block-chain blocks with hashing, nonce and transaction information
linked to anterior blocks
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It requires massive compute power to
operate until the nonce that produced the hash
value satisfies the condition based on difficulty.
We can estimate how many hash operations
are needed before the correct hash is found.
The Bitcoin network has a hash rate of around
1200 quadrillion (1,200P) hashes/s at this time
[12], and it still takes 10 minutes on average to
find the nonce. So 1200 Phash times 10 mins
on average is how many hash operations the
miner needs. There is no easier way to find this
hash value because there is no (known) back
door in the hash function. The only way to
find the right nonce is by performing many
hash operations. Since finding a specific nonce
at every block is very difficult, attackers who
try to forge the block-chain ledger need to find
the corresponding nonce to the changed
transactions.
Assume that an attacker tries to forge the
context, such as the transaction, stored in a
block located a few blocks away from the top
of the block-chain. The change of a single
letter of context will cause a change of the
entire fingerprint of the block. The change of
the block hash of a previous block will change
the whole context of all blocks stacked upon
this block. This means that an attacker must
find the nonce to every block faster than the
current hashing speed of the whole network, so
the forged block-chain can be validated as the
genuine block-chain. For the Bitcoin network,
this work would require more than several
times the hash power currently contributed.
For personal-level processing power, forgery is
impossible. Any transactions included in blocks
are safe from being forged relative to the
amount of hashing power being contributed to
the network. In this case, integrity is well
preserved.
PROPOSED METHOD
Neumann [2] proposed electronic voting
criteria, that include:
 system integrity
 data integrity and reliability
 voter anonymity and data
confidentiality
 operator authentication
As shown, the generation of addresses does
not rely on personally identifiable information
(PII), but allows transparent tracking of
transactions. These transactions are verifiable,
open to the public and are difficult to forge.
Block-chains, then, can guarantee data
integrity and reliability, voter anonymity, data
confidentiality and – at least for the block-
chain – system integrity. Operator
authentication, however, is still required.
User authentication is necessary to ensure
that the person voting has a right to vote.
Once authenticated, a vote from one user must
be tracked to one candidate. In this section we
give a block-chain based voting system with
government-based authentication systems.
Organization, Trusted third
party, Voters, and Block-chain
There are four parts that are involved in this
electronic voting model. An authentication
organization refers to any institution that
holds a voter registration list such as the
National Election Committee or private
companies. Electronic voting systems may be
used for presidential elections, stockholders
meetings, and so on. In a presidential election,
only the National Election Committee will
have the list of voters in their nation. Both
Bitcoin and the proposed voting system are
open to anyone to make any transactions, but
the voting system restricts voters to only those
who have right to vote in their own
organization. As stated, this means
authentication for a user is needed. There are
three problems with this organization. The
first is that an authentication organization
should authenticate the voters, but should not
be able to find who the voter voted for. The
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second is that since the authentication
organization has the voters list, they can
potentially manipulate the number of voters in
their nation. The third potential problem is
that an authentication organization could
potentially provide the majority of nonce
mining. If so, they can potentially forge the
block-chain ledger in the way that they want.
For this reason, a trusted third party
(TTP) is introduced to authenticate voters,
similar to a proxy. The TTP checks if the
voter is authenticated by reporting declaration
of vote to the authentication organization. A
message hash is used for voter authentication
without exposing identity information. A voter
sends his or her own secret message hash to
the authentication organization. Then the
authentication organization, once it
authenticates a registered voter, will link the
message hash to each voter’s identification
when he or she is verified.
The authentication organization decides
whether a voter has the right to vote or not,
according to the voters list, through
identification information such as Social
Security Number (SSN). This ID information
should not be exposed to the public, especially
to the Trusted Third Party; otherwise it could
be used to identify a voter. This means that
when an ID is exposed, then the TTP would
know exactly who voted for whom. Therefore,
a secret message hash is needed to identify and
authenticate valid voters between the
organization and the TTP without directly
providing identifying information.
In our proposed model, we keep vote
transactions in the block-chain. There are
many ways to manage a block-chain, and we
introduce two ways that are useful for voting
purposes.
1. Operating independent block-chain
funded by the organization. Block-chain
receives all transactions cast by anyone. Our
block-chain receives all transactions cast and
stamps them all no matter if it is
authenticated by the organization and Trusted
Third Party. It receives everything, and filters
out unauthenticated or invalidated
transactions. When voting is finished, the list
of validated voters that is kept from the
Trusted Third Party is used to filter out the
transactions that are not validated. All
transaction fees (block-chain processing
charges) will be paid by the organization. A
problem may occur when there are not enough
miners providing hash power, in which case the
independent block-chain will not be secure.
2. Using current Bitcoin block-chain. When
a block-chain network is used, the organization
does not need worry about having its own
miners. There are multiple advantages to using
the Bitcoin block-chain for voter transaction
processing
1. A company or government does not
need to operate an independent block-
chain.
2. There is less risk for transactions to be
forged.
3. Block-chain mining can incur a cost,
but voters could receive tax benefits for
voting, thus covering the costs of
transaction fees while stimulating
participation.
Declaration of a vote
In the voting system, there are individuals who
can and cannot vote, so voters must be
authenticated by an organization. We
introduce declaration to solve this step. A
voter declares a vote by sending a secret
message hash to the authenticating
organization. We assume that the
authenticating organization has already
registered a voter and provides a login for their
account for authentication. The voter then
registers their secret message hash to the
organization. This hash should be unique to
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each voter because this factor is going to be
used as an authentication of votes in the block-
chain.
When the message hash is sent to the
organization holding the list of voters, if he or
she is confirmed to have a vote, then they link
the message hash with the voter’s ID as shown
in Figure 3. There are several IDs that can be
used when voters login with their account. The
reason voters cannot just register the address
derived from their own private key is that the
address will be written on every transaction
that will be open to the public later in the
block-chain. When this address is registered to
the organization, then they can identify a vote
as blocks being stamped. The information
generated from a voter's private key, such as a
public key, public key hash, or address, should
not be registered to the organization, otherwise
they will know who votes for whom. Since all
transactions are stored in an open block-chain,
when you give the organization your public key
as an ID, they can know which user voted for
whom. That is why the secret message hash is
expected to be unique, which is also
independent to the public key used as an ID.
Private Key and Votes
The right to vote is established when the
secret message hash is declared to the
organization. After, the right to vote is derived
only from a private key and the message.
Voting ownership does not belong to the public
key, address, or digital signature. It only
belongs to the private key. The only thing that
voters should keep safe is the private key of
the voter’s account, and the message used
during the declaration of their vote, when the
message hash is made. Assuming that a voter
secures the private key well, only the voter can
access and have control of the right to vote
linked to the address.
Casting a vote
The number of votes is defined as the number
of transactions made to a candidate’s address.
Candidates will provide their addresses fixed
and open to the public to receive transactions
from voters. A person who runs an election will
simply generate their private key, and open up
their address which can be considered as a
container of votes. Then voters make a
transaction to the address of candidates.
Confirming votes
We propose a model to authenticate voters
who have the right to vote and to assure secret
voting. The layers between voters and the
authenticating organization are composed of
two parts. One is the trusted third party, and
the other is block-chain. Overall process is
shown in Figure 4.
When people who want to vote finish the
declaration to vote - when their secret message
hash has been linked with their ID (such as an
SSN) that only the organization has - they
need to make contact with the trusted third
Figure 3. An authenticating organization matching a voter’s secret
message with the voter’s ID.
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party. Voters give the trusted third party their
secret message hash and the trusted third
party will ask the organization if they receive
the same secret message hash from a voter. If
the organization replies ‘yes,’ it means that a
person who sent the hash value is registered as
a valid voter who finished the declaration to
vote. Then the trusted third party recognizes
this person as a proper voter. The trusted
third party saves the voter's public key hash
once they confirm they are a valid voter
through communication with the organization.
Eventually, the trusted third party will have
the list of confirmed public key hashes and the
addresses which are confirmed to be registered
in the organization. By using this registered
address, transactions which are made by an
invalid voter will not be counted but will be
removed when voting is done. The voting
protocol is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4. Process for authenticating organization validate a user and register a secret message later used
to verify authentic voters
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Overall Voting Example
Assume that Alice votes for candidate Bob.
Alice generates a private key/public key pair
and address for the public key hash based on
the Bitcoin protocol. Alice should declare votes
to the authenticating organization by
registering a hash of her secret message. Alice
needs to get authenticated through the trusted
third party. Alice sends the trusted third party
the same message hash used during
registration. The trusted third party then
sends the authenticating organization the same
secret hash received from Alice, asking if the
authenticating organization has the same hash
value. The trusted third party never asks
whose secret message they received; they only
ask if this secret message is held by a verified
voter listed in their voter roster. This step
verifies that the voter is registered at the
authentication organization and can claim the
right to vote. When Alice is a human that
belongs to the group, who appears to have a
vote, and whose secret message hash is
registered, then the organization will send yes-
reply to the trusted third party. This means
that the hash that the organization has is
consistent with the one Alice sent to the
trusted third party. Also, the organization
never sends their real personal identifier so the
trusted third party cannot know who made the
voting transaction.
Assume Alice has a vote, and Charlie does
not, because Charlie is not involved in the
group having votes or not a human. At the
beginning of the registering step, Charlie may
not have logged in to the organization website
and his name wouldn’t have appeared on the
list of voters held by the organization. Charlie
may have failed to declare a vote.
The people who are not eligible to vote,
who did not declare a vote, and cannot register
the hash of their secret message, will never get
a yes-reply from the authenticating
organization to the trusted third party. Since
the authenticating organization does not know
of the addresses of voters, they just know the
secret message hash that corresponds to each
voter and there is no way for them to know
who voted for whom, even when transactions
are all open in Block-chain. They can only
Figure 5. Voting protocol involving an authenticating organization, trusted third party, and voter
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reply yes or no depending on a whether a voter
has declared a vote or not.
Assume that Alice is confirmed to have her
vote declared so the trusted third party has
received a yes-reply from authenticating
organization. Then the trusted third party will
ask Alice to send the secret message which
generates the same hash registered at the
authenticating organization, and send it to the
trusted third party. The trusted third party
then checks if the message is right, and saves
the public key hash which is the address of
Alice. This confirmed address will be used
when filtering out unconfirmed transactions
that are made without declaration and without
conformation from the trusted third party.
Voters could make several transactions to a
candidate and all transactions will be stamped
in the Bitcoin block-chain, but transaction cast
from the same address will only be counted one
time. A transaction itself is a vote.
Filtering Votes
A vote is defined by the number of
transactions cast. In the counting off step, we
calculate the number of votes for each
candidate. Assuming that a voter can vote
only one time, then the number of votes that a
candidate received will be the same to the
number of transaction made to the candidate.
If there is a chance that voters can make
several transactions, these transactions will
only be counted one time. This is the reason
that the trusted third party should keep the
ledger of addresses that are confirmed during
the authenticating step between the
organization and the trusted third party itself.
Several transactions cast from the same
address to candidate A will be counted one
time. Likewise, when several transactions are
made from the same address to more than one
address, for example, to candidate A and
candidate B, this transaction will be
invalidated, and will not be counted as a valid
vote.
Hash Power and Mining
Incentives
When the organization operates their own hash
power, for a common election, the ballot may
be open for 12 hours. If 6 blocks an hour are
assumed, only 72 blocks need be stamped. If an
incentive for mining one block is 100 thousand
dollars, it will take 7.2 million dollars for all
votes to be calculated and verified. That
amount of incentive is likely to bring more
than enough contributors to provide processing
power to keep the block-chain from being
forged. When the organization fails to bring
enough miners, this could cause some
problems. We discuss this at section 4.
When using the current Bitcoin Block-
chain, we do not worry about mining and
incentives, because it already provides enough
hash power so as not to get disrupted by
dishonest miners. The organization will give
voters tax benefits as reimbursement of
transactions fee taken from each transactions.
Fortunately, since the organization has the
voters’ roster, they can tell who is eligible to
receive reimbursement. The Bitcoin collected
in the candidates account will be sent back to
the Bitcoin address where it comes from.
AUDITING
We cannot follow the property of secret voting
without a Trusted Third Party. If we give the
authenticating organization the filtering task
to do, they are able to track down who voted
for whom since they also have the secret
message hash to each ID. Because the TTP
keeps the address and secret message hash for
each verified voter based on the Yes-reply from
the authenticating organization, then they are
able to track down every vote including who
voted for whom. This is the reason we
implement a TTP and it is still dependent on
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the authenticating organization’s response,
because we should not trust the organization
that owns the list of voters. In fact, the TTP
cannot determine whether a voter is valid
without ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses from the
organization. This means that the authority to
validate a voter depends on the authentication
organization. There is a possibility for the
organization to always respond with ‘Yes’ or
‘No’ to manipulate the number of validated
voters. To prevent those kinds of issues, both
the authenticating organization and the
Trusted Third Party need to publish a roster
that consists of verified voter’s account and
hash value of the secret message. That is, cross
auditing should be available and reasonable.
In the first step, the Trusted Third Party
performs random permutation to the verified
voter’s account that is kept in order to filter
out improper transactions, and publish the
hash value of a secret message given by a
voter. This random permutation process will
remove the relation between h(m) and PubKH
as shown in Figure 6. It delinks the ID, in this
case h(m), from PubKH that each voter casts
for. This means that no one knows who voted
for which candidate. The permutation does not
change the voting result, but only changes the
order of the Verified Voter’s Accounts column
in Figure 6.
In the second step, the authenticating
organization needs to simply publish both the
voter’s ID and the hash value of a secret
message that the voter registered at the step of
the declaration of vote. In this step, the voter’s
ID will be known to the public. It means that
the public is able to know who voted or not,
but it does not violate the property of secret
voting since it is unknown who they voted for.
Through these two published lists, voters can
check their hash of the secret message by
themselves after voting. When there is a voter
whose secret message hash does not match
both lists or is not listed at all, then we know
that the organization manipulated the number
of voters or the system of the Trusted Third
Party has some fault. The hash value of a
secret message published from the TTP must
uniquely match one of the hash values owned
by the authenticating organization. The
number of hash values that are shared between
the authenticating organization and the TTP
must also be the same, and the hash values
themselves should all be the same. The only
thing that TTP must do is to perform
permutation of the verified voter’s account
before they publish the list they keep, because
the Public Key Hash is a main component of a
transaction in a block-chain which is
concurrently updated to the public. With these
two published rosters, voters can verify that
their votes were counted, and anyone can
check whether any fraud has happened.
Case 1. When the organization issues more
votes than the number of persons who declare
their vote by using the IDs of those who did
not. This forgery will appear on the roster
published from the organization itself. In the
pair of voter’s ID and secret message hash they
publish, when a person who did not declare
votes, the secret message hash column should
be empty. If the ID holder insists that he or
she did not vote, and still the secret message
hash is filled, then the vote is forged (or the
voter is lying).
Case 2. When other groups of people who
do not have the right to vote attempt voting
transactions, transactions will still be received
and verified to get stamped by the Block-
Chain protocol. Transactions are also left in
the open ledger, but since these groups of
people do not have the right to vote, they
must have failed at the declaration step. This
means that their address can never be
registered at the roster that the TTP holds so
transactions made by them will be filtered out.
Case 3. When a person who is not relevant
to the voting makes a transaction, this will be
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considered as a valid transaction. But this
person will not be verified as a legitimate voter
from the authenticating organization nor by
the filtering roster that the TTP holds.
CONCENSUS ATTACK
Theoretically the block-chain consensus
mechanism is vulnerable when sufficient
hashing power is given to a dishonest miner.
This miner can attack the consensus
mechanism so as to disrupt the availability of
the Bitcoin network. But still a consensus
attack can only affect the blocks coming after
the current block. The Block chain gets more
robust as time passes. Practically, massive
hash power is required to forge blocks at even
a shallow depth because attackers have to
solve multiple nonces while other honest
miners solve only one current nonce.
Additionally, consensus attacks do not affect
the security of private key and signature
algorithms. Consensus attacks cannot steal
coins, consume it, or change past transactions
and ownership records. These attributes are
very important to voting systems, since mining
attacks cannot (with enough hashing power)
change the votes that have been cast. It can
affect only the denial-of-service disruptions on
the creation of future blocks. Since the Bitcoin
network has a large amount of hash power, it
would be very difficult to be disrupted by a
few dishonest miners.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced an electronic
voting system that uses the Block-chain as a
ledger of transactions, where authenticating
and filtering are done by the authenticating
organization and a trusted third party. The
Bitcoin protocol has yet to have failed, and the
block-chain open ledger has never been forged
since it appeared in 2009. Further, the
transparency of the block-chain enables more
auditing and understanding of elections. These
attributes are some of the requirements of a
voting system. These characteristics come from
a decentralized network, and can bring more
democratic processes to elections, especially to
direct election systems.
The proposed protocol changes the
paradigm that we trust a single organization
such as a government or a company. In current
election systems, voters  must trust the vote
records provided by the voting organization
and it is difficult, if not impossible, for a single
voter to prove that there is no fraud. On the
other hand, in the proposed method, the
organization's only job is to send a reply based
on the electoral roll they have, which is an
immensely restricted job scope than before.
With the proposed system, voters have to
identify their right to vote by proving
themselves to both authenticating organization
and the TTP. Then, by publishing both sides
of the roster, voters know that the given vote
is uniquely validated and auditable.
Figure 6. Rosters made public by the authentication organization and Trusted Third Party after voting is
complete.
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